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FITTING A SQUARE PEG INA ROUND
HOLE: WHY TRADITIONAL TORT
PRINCIPLES DO NOT APPLY TO
WRONGFUL BIRTH ACTIONS
Paula Bernstein*
A clinical instructor asks his students to advise an expectant mother on
the fate of a fetus whose father has chronic syphilis. Early siblings were
born with a collection of defects such as deafness, blindness, and
retardation. The usual response of the students is: "Abort!" The
teacher then calmly replies: "Congratulations, you have just aborted
Beethoven.'
INTRODUCTION
Imagine the joy of finding out that you or your spouse is pregnant.
Imagine going to your physician and asking the doctor to perform tests to
find out about possible abnormalities with your child. Imagine no one
telling you anything to suggest that you would give birth to other than a
perfectly healthy baby. Now imagine that when your child is born, he or
she is born with severe birth defects-birth defects that could have and
should have been detected. Would you consider suing your physician?
Finally, imagine that in order to recover compensation, you must be
willing to prove that you would have chosen to abort rather than go
through with the pregnancy.
* J.D. Candidate, 2002, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law; B.A. 1995, University of Florida. The author wishes to thank the Editorial
Board of Volume 18 of The Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy for
their tremendous assistance with this Comment, and her family and friends for
their endless championing of this project and their support throughout law school.
1. Martin A. Trotzig, The Defective Child and the Actions for Wrongful Life
and Wrongful Birth, 14 FAM. L. Q. 15, 38-39 (1980) (quoting Michael Feinman,
Getting Along with the Genetic Genie, LEGAL ASPEcTS OF MED. PRAC. 38, 40
(March 1979)).
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The above situation was real for Margery and Michael Dansby. After
their baby girl was born with birth defects, the Dansbys brought suit
against their physician alleging failure to perform a proper amniocentesis
2
as well as failure to provide information regarding possible abnormalities.
The Dansbys sought compensation for economic losses and emotional
and psychological injuries. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania, however,
dismissed the case under a state statute that proscribes "wrongful birth"
actions.' Pennsylvania is not alone in prohibiting these suits. Citing
public policy and inability to apply tort principles, eleven states enacted
similar bars to wrongful birth actions either through legislative or judicial
action.4 This, however, is the minority view, as most states allow wrongful
birth actions.5
2. Dansby v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 623 A.2d 816 (Pa. 1994). The
Dansbys' daughter was born severely retarded and suffered from spina bifida. See
Dansby, 623 A.2d at 818.
3. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8305 (2001) (providing in part: "There shall be no
cause of action or award of damages on behalf of any person based on a claim
that, but for an act or omission of the defendant, a person once conceived would
not or should not have been born.") Id.
4. See IDAHO CODE § 5-334 (Michie 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.424 (West
1998); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.130 (West 1996); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8305 (2001);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-55-2 (Michie 1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-24
(1996); Wilbur v. Kerr, 628 S.W.2d 568 (Ark. 1982) (declining to create a cause of
action recovering the expense of raising a child); Atlanta Obstetrics and
Gynecology Group v. Abelson, 398 S.E.2d 557 (Ga. 1990); Schork v. Huber, 648
S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1983) (refusing to recognize a cause of action for wrongful
pregnancy based on separation of powers and stating that creation of a new cause
of action is not within the domain of the courts); Taylor v. Kurapati, 600 N.W.2d
670 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999); Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528 (N.C. 1985);
Morris v. Sanchez, 746 P.2d 184 (Okla. 1987) (failing to recognize wrongful birth
where the child is born healthy).
5. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2931 (West 2000) (allowing cause of
action if child has a birth defect but not if the child is born healthy); Keel v.
Banach, 624 So.2d 1022 (Ala. 1993); Walker ex rel Pizano v. Mart, 790 P.2d 735
(Ariz. 1990); Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954 (Cal. 1982); Lininger v. Eisenbaum,
764 P.2d 1202 (Colo. 1988); Garrison v. Med. Ctr. of Del., Inc., 581 A.2d 288 (Del.
1990); Haymon v. Wilkerson, 535 A.2d 880 (D.C. 1987); Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So. 2d
415 (Fla. 1992); Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 512 N.E.2d 691 (Ill. 1987);
Bader v. Johnson, 732 N.E. 2d 1212 (Ind. 2000); Arche v. United States Dep't of
the Army, 798 P.2d 477 (Kan. 1990); Reed v. Campagnolo, 630 A.2d 1145 (Md.
1993); Viccaro v. Milunsky, 551 N.E.2d 8 (Mass. 1990); Greco v. United States,
893 P.2d 345 (Nev. 1995); Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341 (N.H. 1986); Flanagan v.
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Wrongful birth actions can arise when a child is born with a handicap or
deformity and: (1) the physician failed to inform the patient of the risk of
conceiving a defective child; (2) the physician negligently performed a
prenatal diagnostic test; or (3) the physician failed to accurately report the
findings of the prenatal diagnostic test to the parents.6 A successful
wrongful birth action requires the parents then to prove that the physician
acted outside the scope of the recognized standard of care; that the
patient wanted a prenatal diagnostic test; and that if the test results were
revealed to the parents, they would have chosen to abort the "defective"
fetus Acknowledging this cause of action also requires courts to concede
8that giving birth to a child with birth defects is an "injury" to the parents.
Not surprisingly, states vary on how to handle wrongful birth actions.
This Comment addresses how several states handle wrongful birth
actions and analyzes the conflicting public policy concerns associated with
this emerging tort. Part I distinguishes wrongful birth actions from
wrongful life and wrongful pregnancy or conception torts and provides
background information on each of these torts. Part II addresses why
some states bar wrongful birth actions and why others choose to allow
them. Part III focuses on the conflicting public policy concerns that
underlie a state's decision to prohibit wrongful birth actions. Part IV
concludes with a prediction that if statutes and common law grounds for
denying the actions are challenged in the U.S. Supreme Court, it is likely
that public policy concerns will drive the Court's determination of
whether or not tort principles apply to wrongful birth actions.
Williams, 623 N.E.2d 185 (Ohio 1993); Emerson v. Magendantz, 689 A.2d 409
(R.I. 1997); Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1984); Naccash v. Burger, 290
S.E.2d 825 (Va. 1982); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983)
(en banc); James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872 (W. Va. 1985); Dumer v. St.
Michael's Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372 (Wis. 1975).
6. See Pamela S. Stever, Comment, Haymon v. Wilkerson: The Wrongful
Birth Cause of Action Emerges in the District of Columbia, 5 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH
L. & POL'Y 281, 283-84 (1989). Aborting a fetus because it is "undesirable" is
referred to as a "eugenic" abortion. See Vurlender v. Bio-Science Lab. 106 Cal.
App. 3d 811, 829 (1980).
7. See Stever, supra note 6 at 283-284.
8. See id. at 285.
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I. WRONGFUL BIRTH ACTIONS DISTINGUISHED FROM WRONGFUL
LIFE AND WRONGFUL CONCEPTION TORTS
Courts and legislatures have distinguished wrongful birth actions from
two related torts, namely, wrongful life actions and wrongful pregnancy or
conception torts. Although all three actions arise from essentially the
same event-the birth of an unwanted or unplanned child, usually with
birth defects-courts treat these torts differently.
A. Wrongful Life Actions
One of the first wrongful life claims was Zepeda v. Zepeda.9 In this
case, an illegitimate child sued his father for having conceived him out of
wedlock, thus subjecting him to a lifetime of scorn. ° Most often, in
wrongful life cases a child born with a birth defect sues the mother's
physician for damages. Wrongful life actions are sometimes coupled with
wrongful birth actions. Whereas in a wrongful birth action the parents
claim harm or injury, in wrongful life cases, the child, or a representative
of the child, asserts that but for the physician's failure to inform the
parents that the child would be born with birth defects, the child would
not have been born at all, and thus would not have suffered injuries."
These wrongful life actions require the presumption that had the mother
known of the defect she would have elected to abort the fetus." The
claims also require the court to recognize that the non-existence of a life is
preferable to a life inflicted with a handicap or defect. Courts have
essentially rejected these arguments, citing the preciousness of life and theS 13
inability to find harm in allowing one to live. Currently, only California
9. 190 N.E.2d 849 (I11. App. Ct. 1963).
10. Id. at 851. The court refused to recognize a wrongful life claim and
deferred the determination to the legislature. Id. at 859.
11. Michael A. Berenson, Comment, The Wrongful Life Claim - the Legal
Dilemma of Existence Versus Nonexistence: "To Be or Not to Be," 64 TUL. L. REV.
895,897 (1990).
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., Elliot v. Brown, 361 So.2d 546 (Ala. 1978) (refusing to recognize
wrongful life cause of action); Walker ex rel Pizano v. Mart, 790 P.2d 735 (Ariz.
1990); Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202 (Colo. 1988); Garrison v. Med. Ctr.
of Del., Inc., 581 A.2d 288 (Del. 1989); Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So.2d 415 (Fla. 1992);
Blake v. Cruz, 698 P.2d 315 (Idaho 1984); Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 512
N.E.2d 691 (Ill. 1987); Cowe v. Forum Group, Inc., 575 N.E.2d 630 (Ind. 1991);
Bruggeman v. Schimke, 718 P.2d 635 (Kan. 1986); Viccaro v. Milunsky, 551
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and Washington recognize wrongful life claims."
B. Wrongful Conception Actions
Wrongful conception or pregnancy cases, on the other hand, involve
situations where sterilization was performed incorrectly and a subsequent
pregnancy results in an action against the negligent physician. One of the
first wrongful conception cases was Christensen v. Thornby."5 In Thornby,
Mr. Christensen's doctor failed to perform a proper vasectomy, which
resulted in Mrs. Christensen becoming pregnant, a condition that was
potentially fatal for her. Mrs. Christensen survived the pregnancy and
gave birth to a healthy baby. Thereafter, Mr. Christensen brought an
action against his physician to indemnify him for the great emotional
distress suffered during Mrs. Christensen's pregnancy." The court
conducted a cost-benefit analysis and held that the "blessing" of the child
outweighed any cost or anxiety caused by the physician's failure to
properly perform the vasectomy. 7  Because the child in a wrongful
conception case is normally born healthy, courts typically will limit
damages in these cases to the expenses associated with giving birth. The
rationale for this limitation was articulated in Macomber v. Dillman."8 In
Macomber, the court held that "for reasons of public policy.., a parent
cannot be said to have been damaged or injured by the birth and rearing
N.E.2d 8 (Mass. 1990); Wilson v. Kuenzi, 751 S.W.2d 741 (Mo. 1988); Azzolino v.
Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528 (N.C. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 835 (1986); Smith v.
Cote, 513 A.2d 341 (N.H. 1986); Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978);
Ellis v. Sherman, 515 A.2d 1327 (Pa. 1986); Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918
(Tex. 1984); James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872 (W. Va. 1985); Dumer v. St.
Michael's Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372 (Wis. 1975); Beardsley v. Weirdsma, 650 P.2d
288 (Wyo. 1982).
14. See Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954 (Cal. 1982) (allowing the plaintiff to
recover special damages but not general damages because of the difficulty in
assessing whether being born was in fact an injury); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc.
656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983) (en banc) (allowing the plaintiff to recover full
damages).
15. 255 N.W. 620 (Minn. 1934).
16. See id. Mr. Christensen claimed that the anxiety was a result of concern
that his wife, who had been told that childbearing could be fatal, might have died
during pregnancy as a result of the failed vasectomy. Id. at 621.
17. See id. at 622.
18. 505 A.2d 810 (Me. 1986).
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of a healthy, normal child."' 9
C. Wrongful Birth Actions
Wrongful birth actions emerged primarily as a result of two
occurrences.20 The first concerns the advances in medical technology that
make prenatal diagnostic testing possible.2 Such advances allowed for the
detection of birth defects in utero. This new technology gave parents the
opportunity to consider how these defects would affect their lives and the
life of their child. The second occurrence was the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Roe v. Wade.2  Roe placed abortion within the
constitutionally protected right to privacy. These two occurrences
provided parents with the option to choose to abort a fetus they believe
would likely be born with birth defects. Consequently, many courts now
allow parents to bring an action against a physician who, through his or
her negligence in failing to properly find a defect in utero, impairs the
parents' right to abort.2
Wrongful birth actions are thus distinguishable from wrongful life or
wrongful conception torts. Generally, courts are more willing to allow
recovery for wrongful birth actions than for wrongful life or wrongful
conception actions, primarily because courts can apply more easily
traditional tort principles to wrongful birth actions.
II. THE DIFFICULTY ESTABLISHING WRONGFUL BIRTH AS A TORT
Courts that recognize wrongful birth claims do so by fitting the action
within the framework of tort law. In Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, 2 the
Washington Supreme Court, in deciding whether or not to recognize
19. Id. at 813.
20. See Philip J. Van Derhoef, Note, Washington Recognizes Wrongful Birth
and Wrongful Life - A Critical Analysis - Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 58
WASH. L. REV. 649, 655 (1983).
21. See Stever, supra note 6, at 290 n.55 ("Amniocentesis, as well as fetoscopy,
chorionic villus sampling, ultrasound examination and cytogenic assessment are
some of the tests currently employed in prenatal genetic diagnosis.") (citing
Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 19 (1985)).
22. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
23. See id.
24. See statute and cases cited supra note 5.
25. 656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983) (en banc).
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wrongful birth actions, concluded that such action "conforms comfortably
to the structure of tort principles" and is a "logical and necessary
26development" of tort law. The court analyzed the elements of a medical
malpractice claim-duty, breach, proximate cause, injury, and damages-in
terms of the wrongful birth action. Like other states, the Supreme Court
of Washington held that wrongful birth actions fit "within the conceptual
framework of [the] law of negligence."2 7
The tort of medical malpractice requires a showing that the physician
owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, and that the physician breached that
duty. Physicians are required to "have and use the knowledge, skill and
care ordinarily possessed and employed by members of the profession in
good standing."' Wrongful birth actions, unlike medical malpractice
claims, do not involve a physical injury to the plaintiff. Rather, the
alleged injury is based on the physician's depriving the plaintiff of the
right to choose whether or not to terminate the pregnancy of a defective
fetus.
Some state legislatures and courts, however, believe that wrongful birth
actions do not fit neatly into the framework of tort principles.2 In fact,
applying the elements of a malpractice suit has caused some courts
difficulty. ° The first two prongs of the four-prong tort analysis-duty and
breach-can easily be established. It is generally recognized that a
physician owes a duty of care to the patient, and that not performing a
prenatal diagnostic test, or performing the tests deficiently, will be seen as
a breach of the physician's duty. The difficulty, however, emerges when a
party attempts to establish an injury. As the Supreme Court of Georgia
held, "[w]here the traditional tort analysis begins to break down is with
the third prong, that of injury. In order to satisfy that prong, we must
recognize the life of the child as the injury which has been inflicted upon
plaintiffs by the defendants."'] Because of the difficulty in applying tort
26. Id. at 488.
27. Id. at 494.
28. Stever, supra note 6, at 283 (citing PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 4 at 20-25 (W. Keeton, et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984)).
29. See e.g., Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983) (en
banc); Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528 (N.C. 1985); Atlanta Obstetrics and
Gynecology Group v. Abelson, 398 S.E.2d 557 (Ga. 1990).
30. See id.
31. Atlanta Obstetrics & Gynecology Group v. Abelson, 398 S.E.2d 557, 561
(Ga. 1990).
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elements to wrongful birth actions, some courts have opted not to
recognize the cause of action. In fact, even in states that do permit
wrongful birth actions, courts struggle with applying traditional tort
elements.
A. State Courts that Apply Medical Malpractice Principles to Wrongful
Birth
1. Washington
The Washington Supreme Court first recognized wrongful birth claims
in 1983 in Harbeson v. Parke-Davis.32 Applying traditional tort principles,
the court held that the cause of action "conforms comfortably to the
structure of tort principles and that recognition of wrongful birth claims is
a logical and necessary development" of tort law.33
In Harbeson, plaintiff Jean Harbeson, an epileptic, and her husband,
Leonard Harbeson, a member of the United States Air Force, sued
physicians for failing to inform them of the risks associated with taking a
prescription drug during Mrs. Harbeson's pregnancy and the potential
effects it might have on the birth of their daughters. Mrs. Harbeson had a
complicated pregnancy in which she suffered seizures. To control seizures
during her first pregnancy, Mrs. Harbeson's physicians prescribed the
anticonvulsant drug Dilantin.34 When the Harbesons decided to have
more children, they informed three doctors of their desire and inquired
about the risks involved with Mrs. Harbeson's continued use of Dilantin.35
Each doctor informed the couple that the risks involved were minor.36
Relying on the doctors' assurances, Mrs. Harbeson continued to take
Dilantin and subsequently gave birth to two daughters, one in April 1974,
the second in May 1975. 37  Both daughters, however, suffered from
physical and developmental birth defects known as "fetal hydantoin
32. 656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983) (en banc). With this opinion, the court also
became one of the few states to recognize wrongful life claims.
33. Id. at 488.
34. See id. at 486. Mrs. Harbeson took the drug during her first pregnancy and
gave birth to a healthy boy, Michael. Id. at 486.
35. Id. at 486.
36. See id. at 486. The doctors assured the Harbeson's the only risks
associated with taking Dilantin included causing cleft palate and temporary
hairiness. Id. at 486.
37. Id.
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syndrome."" Because of the birth defects, the Harbesons filed suit
claiming that if they had known of these potential injuries, they would not
have brought the pregnancies to term.39
The Harbeson court was faced with deciding whether or not the
traditional tort concepts of duty, breach, injury and proximate cause
applied to wrongful birth injuries. The court considered it a "major step
toward recognizing the wrongful birth action" when it recognized that a
duty existed.4 0 The second element of tort analysis, breach, was easily
established. The court held that breach could be measured as the failure
to apply the appropriate standard of care.4 ' Finding injury proved more
difficult for the court. Having already established that parents have a
right to avoid a defective birth, the court recognized that the birth of a
defective child could therefore be an injury. After recognizing that a
wrongful birth was an injury, the court was forced to determine how to
measure the extent of that injury.
Calculating damages presents a challenge for many courts considering
wrongful birth actions,4 and Washington is no exception. The court
reviewed Washington state law and identified a relevant statute, RCW
4.24.010.43 The statute provided that in an action for an injury to their
child, parents could recover damages for medical needs, loss of the child's
love and companionship, services and support, and injury to the parent-
child relationship." The statute, however, was not directly applicable
because it allowed for parents to be compensated for their child's injuries.
The "injury" in a wrongful birth action is the birth of the child. The court,
38. Id. at 489. The daughters suffered "mild to moderate developmental
retardation, wide-set eyes, lateral ptosis (drooping eyelids) hypoplasia of the
fingers, small nails, low-set hairline, broad nasal ridge, and other.., defects" Id.
at 489.
39. See id.
40. See, e.g., Harbeson, 656 P.2d at 492; Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d
528 (N.C. 1985); Atlanta Obstetrics and Gynecology Group v. Abelson, 398
S.E.2d 557 (Ga. 1990); Id. at 492 (relying on the fact that all other jurisdictions to
have considered the issue at that time recognized a duty).
41. Harbeson, 656 P.2d 483, 488.
42. See, e.g., Harbeson, 656 P.2d 483; Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528
(N.C. 1985); Atlanta Obstetrics and Gynecology Group v. Abelson, 398 S.E.2d
557 (Ga. 1990).
43. Harbeson, 656 P.2d 483, 492 n.9 (citing Wash. Rev. Code § 4.24.010
(2001)).
44. Id. at 492.
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nevertheless, found "no compelling reason that the policy should not
apply in wrongful birth actions."" Thus the court held that parents in
wrongful birth actions could recover damages for medical expenses and
for their emotional injuries.
When considering whether the Harbesons' physicians were the cause of
the couple's injuries, the court stated that proximate cause could be
established by showing that the physicians' breach of duty caused the
injury and that liability should attach as a matter of law.47 The court also
stated that cause in fact would be established by showing that, but for the
breach, there would have been no injury.48 The court already determined
that the injury was not the birth defect, but the birth of the child itself.
Therefore, the court held that the proximate cause prong would be
satisfied if cause in fact could be established.4 ' That is, but for the doctors'
failure to inform the Harbesons of the potential birth defects associated
with Mrs. Harbeson's medication, the court questioned whether the
children would have been born. The court held that were it not for the
physicians' negligence, the children would not have been born.
The Washington Supreme Court had little difficulty establishing that
wrongful birth actions fit neatly within the traditional tort principles of
malpractice. The court, therefore, allowed wrongful birth lawsuits to be
filed in the state courts. Other states agreed with the Washington court
decision and also allow wrongful birth actions. Some states, however,
have refused to consider the tort claims under the name "wrongful birth,"
and instead will only allow the tort to be filed as a medical malpractice
cause of action.5 Two states with such a practice are Nevada, and most
recently, Indiana."
45. Id. at 493. (holding that "[tihe statute is not directly in point because a
wrongful birth claim does not allege injury to the child as the cause of the parents'
injury; rather it alleges the birth of the child is the cause of the injury.") Id.
46. See id. at 493. (noting, however, that damages could be offset by the
emotional benefits to the parents resulting from the birth of the child).
47. Id. at 493.
48. See id.
49. See Harbeson, 656 P.2d at 493.
50. See statutes and cases cited supra note 4.
51. See Bader v. Johnson, 732 N.E.2d 1212 (Ind. 2000); Greco v. United
States, 893 P.2d 345 (Nev. 1995).
52. See id.
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2. Nevada
In 1995, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmatively answered the
question of whether a mother of a child born with defects has a cause of
action. Under the state's common law of negligence, the court held
against a physician who caused the mother to be unaware of the fact that
her baby would be born with serious defects. 3 The court, however,
refused to label the suit a "wrongful birth" action, and only considered the
case as a claim for medical malpractice.
Sundi Greco brought an action to recover damages "arising out of the
negligence of physicians who.., negligently failed to make a timely
diagnosis of physical defects and anomalies afflicting the child when it was
still in the mother's womb. 5 4 Mrs. Greco asserted that because of her
physicians' negligence she was denied the opportunity to terminate her
pregnancy that ultimately caused her to give birth to a child with severe
birth defects.5 Sundi Greco asserted that her physicians' negligence
denied her the opportunity to terminate her pregnancy and thereby
caused damages attendant to the avoidable birth of an unwanted and
severely deformed child."
The court applied medical malpractice principles and found that
Greco's physicians negligently failed to perform tests that would have
discovered her fetus's deformities, thereby denying her the opportunity to
terminate her pregnancy. 7 The court rejected the defendant's arguments
that Mrs. Greco suffered no injury and that, even if she had, the injury
was not caused by her physicians.58
First, the court did not have any trouble finding that the birth of a
53. See Greco v. United States, 893 P.2d 345 (Nev. 1995).
54. Greco v. United States, 893 P.2d 345 (Nev. 1995).
55. Id. at 347 n.2.
[the child] was born with congenial myelomeningocele (spina
bifida). Congenital macro/hydrocephaly, bilateral talipes varus
deformity and Arnold Chiari malformation, type two. [The
child] required placement of a ventriculoperitoneal shunt for
hydrocephalus. He has paraplegia with no sensation from the
hips down and suffers permanent fine and gross motor
retardation and mental retardation.
Id.
56. Id. at 346.
57. See id. at 348.
58. Id.
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deformed baby constituted an injury. They described the birth as "an
unpleasant and aversive event and the cause of inordinate financial
burden."6 Citing the enormous physical, emotional, and financial
burdens that a child with serious birth defects will have on a family, the
court concluded that an injury had occurred as a result of the physician's
61
medical malpractice.
The defendants also claimed they should be free from liability because
their care, while possibly negligent, did not cause the defects to the child. 62
The court, straying from the standard tort principle of "causal injury,"
stated that the injury to Greco was not the birth of a child with
deformities, but the lost right to choose whether or not to terminate her63
pregnancy. Thus, the doctors did not cause the harm to the fetus, as with
traditional torts, but instead they were the cause of the loss of the option
to terminate. The court held that this injury was sufficient to establish
cause. Acknowledging its deviation from traditional tort principles when
it addressed damages, the court stated that "[c]ourts in these cases have
struggled with what items of damages are recoverable because, unlike the
typical malpractice claim, claims such as Sundi Greco's do not involve a
physical injury to the patient's person." 64 Despite this derivation from
traditional notions of causation, the court found all the necessary
elements to establish a cause of action for a medical malpractice claim.
Thus, the court allowed the wrongful birth action, notwithstanding its
reluctance to call it such.
3. Indiana
Most recently, the Indiana Supreme Court, in Bader v. Johnson65,
declined to adopt the new tort of "wrongful birth."66 Like the Nevada
Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of Indiana allows plaintiffs, in what
would be termed a "wrongful birth" action, to bring a negligence claim
against their physician. In Bader, the court held that "[l]abeling the
59. Id. For cases holding the contrary view, see discussion infra Section II.B.
60. 893 P.2d at 349.
61. See id. at 351.
62. Id. at 349.
63. Id.
64. Id. (emphasis added).
65. Bader v. Johnson, 732 N.E.2d 1212 (Ind. 2000)
66. See id.
67. See id.
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Johnsons' cause of action as 'wrongful birth' adds nothing to the analysis,
inspires confusion, and implies the court has adopted a new tort." 61 The
court instead applied traditional tort principles to the suit that was
brought by Ronald and Connie Johnson against their physician for failing
to inform them that their unborn child had multiple birth defects. 69 In
response to the Johnsons' claim, the defendants filed a motion for
summary judgment contending that Indiana does not recognize wrongful
birth actions.70 The court, quoting the Nevada Supreme Court decision in
Greco, stated, "we see no reason for compounding or complicating our
medical malpractice jurisprudence by according this particular form of
professional negligence action some special status apart from presently
recognized medical malpractice or by giving it the name of 'wrongful
birth,"' but permitted the plaintiffs to go forward on a medical
malpractice cause of action.
Relying on traditional tort principles, the court held that the defendant,
Healthcare Providers, owed a duty to the plaintiffs to disclose the results
of an ultrasound that would have shown "a fetus with a larger than
expected cavity within the brain and an unusual head shape. 72
Healthcare Providers breached that duty because the standard of care fell
below the applicable standard of care.7' The court then addressed the
final elements of a medical malpractice action-compensable injury
proximately caused by the breach. Although Healthcare Providers
contended that the child's injury was not caused by their actions, the court
disregarded this argument. 74 The court, like the courts in Washington and
Nevada, identified the parents' emotional suffering, rather than the child's
birth defects, as the injury.75 The Johnsons claimed that but for the
defendant's failure to inform them of the results of the ultrasound, they
would have aborted the fetus. The court questioned, however, whether or
not the Johnsons could meet their burden of proving that the fetus would
76have been aborted. The court stated that it would not handle the
68. Id. at 1216.
69. Id. at 1215.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1215.
73. Id. at 1218.
74. Id. at 1218-19.
75. Id. at 1219.
76. Id. at 1218. The court determined that whether or not the Johnson's could
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Johnsons' case any differently from any other medical malpractice claim."
It held that damages could be awarded for medical expenses associated
with the pregnancy, delivery, child care, lost income, and emotional
suffering.8
Notwithstanding, in his dissent, Justice Dickson took issue with the
court's treatment of wrongful birth actions as a medical malpractice
action, especially with regard to how the court calculated damages.
79
Justice Dickson believed that courts and juries were ill equipped to deal
with cases that involved "a calculation of damages dependent upon the
relative benefits of an impaired life as opposed to no life at all."' His
dissent stated that such treatment established a "troubling precedent." 81
He anticipated that the court's decision would lead to allowing parents to
recover damages for the expenses associated with the birth and rearing of
other "unwanted" children."
Some state courts have responded similarly and apply traditional
medical malpractice or negligence principles to wrongful birth actions.
Other states, however, prohibit wrongful birth actions, citing an inability
to apply traditional tort principles to these actions. These states have
found that traditional tort principles would have to be compromised in
order to allow wrongful birth actions to fit neatly within them. Some
courts have banned the actions and left further action up to the state
legislatures. These courts have rejected the invitation to compromise tort
principles in order to accommodate wrongful birth actions, basing these
decisions primarily on public policy and the sanctity of life.
meet the burden of proving that they would have elected to abort was an issue for
the trial court.
77. Id. at 1220.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1223. (Dickson, J., dissenting).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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B. State Courts That Proscribe Wrongful Birth Actions Because
Traditional Tort Principles Do Not Apply
1. North Carolina
In Azzolino v. Dingfelder,"' the parents of Michael L. Azzolino brought
suit against Mrs. Azzolino's obstetric physicians. The Azzolinos claimed
that Mrs. Azzolino's physicians negligently failed to inform them of the
need for an amniocentesis, a test that would have revealed that Mrs.
Azzolinos would give birth to a child with Down's Syndrome. 8 The
parents claimed that if they had known about the test, they would have
learned about Michael's affliction before his birth and would have had an
abortion.85
The North Carolina Supreme Court denied the Azzolinos' claim,
holding that wrongful birth actions could not fit into traditional tort
analysis. Although the court found that the physicians had a duty to
inform the Azzolinos of possible birth defects, and that the duty was
breached, it had difficulty determining whether the physicians' breach of
the duty proximately caused the parents' injury. Furthermore, the court
was unwilling to consider life an "injury." 86 Focusing on these two issues,
the court criticized other state courts for applying tort principles that, in
its opinion, clearly did not apply, stating that:
[clourts which purport to analyze wrongful birth claims in terms
of "traditional" tort analysis are able to proceed to this point
but no further before their "traditional" analysis leaves all
tradition behind or begins to break down. In order to allow
recovery such courts must then take a step into entirely
untraditional analysis by holding that the existence of a human
life can constitute an injury cognizable at law.87
The court also had difficulty calculating damages. Noting courts that
allowed wrongful birth actions are unable to reach a consensus on how to
assess or award damages, the court suggested this lack of uniformity arises
from the inability to consider life an "injury." " A central issue in
83. 337 S.E.2d 528 (N.C. 1985).
84. See id. at 530.
85. See id.
86. Id. at 534.
87. Id. at 533-34. (emphasis in original).
88. See id. at 534. Some courts have allowed the parents to recover the
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calculating damages is whether the love and affection the parents will
receive from the impaired child should offset the amount awarded. 9 The
court also questioned whether or not parents would be required to
attempt to mitigate the damages;90 for example, would physicians be able
to reduce damages by suggesting that the parents could have put their
child up for adoption?9' Finally, the court noted that wrongful birth cases
require parents to convince a jury that if they had known the fetus was
defective they would have chosen to abort the fetus, and would not have
changed their minds.
The court ultimately held that the legislature is better suited to decide
questions surrounding wrongful birth actions because it is not "required
to attempt to squeeze its results into the mold of conventional tort
concepts which clearly do not fit." Thus, the court refused to recognize
wrongful birth actions.
2. Georgia
In 1990, the Supreme Court of Georgia considered whether or not to
recognize wrongful birth actions in Atlanta Obstetrics & Gynecology
Group v. Abelson.93 Mr. and Mrs. Abelson filed suit against Dr. William
Tippins and his associates after their daughter Brittany was born with
Down's Syndrome. The Abelsons claimed that the defendants failed to
inform Mrs. Abelson of the risks associated with pregnancy at her age.94
The couple also claimed that the defendants did not inform her of the
availability of an amniocentesis. 95  The Abelsons sought general and
extraordinary expenses resulting from the child's impairment but not the expenses
they would normally incur in rearing the child. Other courts have permitted
damages only for the parents' pain, suffering and mental anguish resulting from
the birth of the defective child. Others have allowed both the extraordinary
expenses and recovery for mental anguish. At least one court has allowed parents
to recover all expenses involved in rearing the child with no reduction of the
damages awarded by the cost of rearing a normal child (citations omitted). See id.
89. Id. at 534.
90. Id. at 535.
91. See id.
92. Id. at 537.
93. 398 S.E.2d 557 (Ga. 1990).
94. See id. at 558. Mrs. Abelson was thirty-seven years old. Id. at 558
95. See id. at 558 n.1 "Amniocentesis is said to be highly reliable in
ascertaining whether a fetus is afflicted with Down's Syndrome". Id.
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special damages for, among other things, birth-related expenses, pain and
suffering, emotional damages, and the costs of raising Brittany.
The state Supreme Court dismissed the case because the court refused
to recognize wrongful birth actions.96 The court made it clear that
wrongful birth actions could not fit within traditional tort principles.97 It
found that although breach and duty could be easily recognized, damages
and causation would not conform to basic tort principles.98 Following the
rationale of the North Carolina Supreme Court in Azzolino, the Georgia
Supreme Court held, "[w]e are unwilling to take any such step because we
are unwilling to say that life, even with severe [impairments], may ever
amount to a legal injury."'99 Thus, the court refused to find that the birth
of a child, even with birth defects, could be considered an injury that
physicians might inflict upon parents) °° The court further reasoned that
because the physician did not cause the defect, traditional principles of
causation could not be followed.
An analysis of traditional tort law principles, even as applied in
an age of ever advancing medical technology, simply does not
authorize a finding that a physician, who has provided
postconception prenatal care to an expectant mother, should be
held liable, even to a limited extent, for an impairment which
the child unquestionably inherited from her parents and an
impairment which was already in existence when the parents
first came into contact with the physician. 1
The Abelson court, like the North Carolina court, deferred future
action to the state legislature. The Georgia court held that the legislature
was the "forum wherein all of the issues, policy considerations and long
range consequences involved in recognition of the novel concept of a
'wrongful birth' cause of action can be thoroughly and openly debated
and ultimately decided."'1° Georgia lawmakers, however, have not passed
legislation regarding wrongful birth actions, and the Abelson decision
barring wrongful birth actions remains binding.
96. See id. at 563.
97. Id.
98. See id. at 561-63.
99. Id. at 561 (quoting Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528, 534 (N.C.
1985)).
100. Id. (emphasis added)
101. Id. at 560.
102. Id.
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3. Michigan
In 1999, the Court of Appeals of Michigan joined the North Carolina
and Georgia courts when the court reversed prior holdings 103 and held that
it would no longer recognize a cause of action for wrongful birth10
4
Although the court had previously recognized wrongful birth actions, it
held that "resulting jurisprudence defie[d] all logic," 105 and that the cases
allowing wrongful birth actions had been wrongly decided.'8 The court
held in Taylor v. Kurapati'0 7 that wrongful birth actions had no place in
the state's jurisprudence, absent a legislative directive. The case was
initiated when Mr. and Mrs. Taylor brought suit against their physician
for incorrectly interpreting an ultrasound that would have detected that
their child would be born with "gross anatomical deformities including
missing right shoulder, fusion of left elbow, missing digits on [her] left
hand, missing femur on [the] left leg and short femur on [the] right."'0 9
The court abandoned the use of tort principles to allow wrongful birth
actions and instead based its holding on public policy. The Michigan
court noted that even though Roe v. Wade" provided a constitutionally
protected right to privacy, it "implies no limitation on the authority of a
State to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion.' The
court held that Michigan law favors childbirth over abortion, and that the
state has "no obligation to take the affirmative step of imposing civil
liability on a party for failing to provide a pregnant woman with
information that would make her more likely to have an elective, and
eugenic abortion."
'
"
2
The Michigan court stated that assessing causation and damages would
103. See Eisbrenner v. Stanley, 308 N.W.2d 209 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981); Dorlin
v. Providence Hosp., 325 N.W.2d 600 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982); Strohmaier v.
Associates in Obsterics & Gynecology, 332 N.W.2d 432 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982);
Proffitt v. Bartolo, 412 N.W.2d 232 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987); Rinard v. Biczak, 441
N.W.2d 441 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
104. See Taylor v. Kurapati, 600 N.W.2d 670 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999).
105. Id. at 684.
106. Id. at 687.
107. 600 N.W.2d 670 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999).
108. See id. at 673.
109. Id. at 674.
110. Roe, 410 U.S. 113.
111. Taylor, 600 N.E.2d at 687.
112. Id. at 689.
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be difficult, as they would be "based on after-the-fact, possibly self-
serving, testimony that the parents would have sought an abortion had
they known of the child's potential disability. 113 In addition, permitting
wrongful birth actions would demand that a jury weigh the costs of raising
a child born with birth defects against the benefits to the parent of having
a disabled child."' The court concluded that such benefits are
"unquantifiable," stating:
How, for example, would a hypothetical Grecian jury, operating
under Michigan jurisprudence, measure the benefits to the
parents of the whole life of Homer, the blind singer of songs who
created the Iliad and the Odyssey? Absent the ability to foretell
the future and to quantify the value of the spoken and then the
written word, how, exactly, would the jury do that?"'
Conceding that the decision in Taylor deviated from its prior holding,
the court maintained that rejecting wrongful birth actions was a "much
sounder rule of law.".. 6 The court concluded that if the state was going to
recognize the tort, it should do so in the proper arena-the legislature."'
As the preceding cases indicate, some courts are reluctant to find a
cause of action in wrongful birth cases. Rather, they defer to the state
legislature to address this issue. Until now, courts have been unable to
uniformly apply traditional tort principle to wrongful birth actions. The
decision whether or not to allow the tort varies by state. State courts that
have proscribed wrongful birth actions generally have held that
legislatures are in a better position to decide whether or not to allow such
suits. Following this cue, six states that prohibit wrongful birth actions do
so statutorily.118
In Pennsylvania, for example, the legislature was concerned that by
allowing wrongful birth actions, the state would be sanctioning eugenic
abortions of less-than-perfect children. 9  The legislation sought to
113. Id. at 688 n.44.
114. Id. at 688.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 691.
117. Id.
118. See IDAHO CODE § 5-334 (Michie 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.424
(West 1998); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.130 (West 1996); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
8305 (West 1998); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-55-2 (Michie 1987); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-11-24 (1996).
119. See Karen L. Merrifield, 3 PA. JUR. Torts § 40:6 (1999).
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prevent the courts from endorsing the idea that the birth of a handicapped
child is a damaging event.'2 Another objective was to prevent physicians
from accepting eugenic abortions in order to avoid being sued in wrongful
birth action."' Thus public policy issues play a significant role when
courts and legislatures consider the appropriateness of wrongful birth
actions.
III. PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES
Given the majority of states that allow for wrongful birth actions, it is
likely that the U.S. Supreme Court will hear a challenge to a state statute
or common law rule that prohibits such law suits. There are compelling
122legal arguments as to why the tort should or should not be permitted, so
the Court is likely base its decision on public policy concerns. The most
persuasive of these arguments are the fear of eugenic abortions, the
possible effects on the medical community, and the sanctity of life.
A. The Slippery Slope; Eugenic Abortions
The fear of eugenic abortions is one of the major controversies
surrounding wrongful birth actions. As medical technology advances and
new diagnostic techniques allow doctors to discover birth defects in utero,
potential parents are put in the position of being able to decide whether
to abort a defective fetus. The Harbeson majority eloquently articulated
its concern over whether this will lead to eugenic abortions. The court
questioned: "Are these developments the first steps towards a 'Fascist-
Orwellian societal attitude of genetic purity,' or Huxley's brave new
world? Or do they provide positive benefits to individual families and to
all society by avoiding the vast emotional and economic cost of defective
children?""'
Likewise, the Court of Appeals of Michigan expressed similar concerns
about the possibility of eugenic abortions and wrote extensively about the
issue in Taylor. T2
The very phrase "wrongful birth" suggests that the birth of the
disabled child was wrong and should have been prevented. If
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See discussion infra Section II.
123. Harbeson, 656 P.2d at 492 (Wash. 1983) (citations omitted).
124. See Taylor, 600 N.W.2d at 670, 688-91 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999).
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one accepts the premise that the birth of one "defective" child
should have been prevented, then it is but a short step to
accepting the premise that the birth of classes of "defective"
children should be similarly prevented, not just for the benefit of
the parents but also for the benefit of society as a whole through
the protection of the "public welfare. 125
The court was concerned primarily with the possibility that allowing
wrongful birth actions would begin a descent down a slippery slope of
eugenic abortions as medical technology became more and more
advanced.126
The Washington Supreme Court, on the other hand, chose to recognize
the benefits of emerging technology and held that parents have the right
to choose to abort a defective fetus and that physicians have a duty to
provide parents with the information to make that choice.' The North
Carolina Supreme Court recognized the issue was a bit more complicated.
In Azzolino, the court noted that states that allow wrongful birth actions
would eventually be required to determine the point at which a fetus is
"defective."' 28 Similarly, courts will have to determine what constitutes a
"defective" fetus. 9  Indiana Supreme Court Justice Brent Dickson,
writing in his dissent in Bader, pondered: "Will our courts face actions by
parents seeking child-rearing costs because the gender of their child was
not as expected, when they had sought genetic counseling for the purpose
of terminating the pregnancy in the event that the child was the 'wrong
gender?""3
Although parents, as a result of Roe v. Wade, do have the right to abort
a "defective" baby, states may still choose to "make a value judgment
favoring childbirth over abortion.''. States that have chosen to prohibit
wrongful birth actions are exercising that judgment. Should the U.S.
Supreme Court elect to decide whether to allow states to continue
prohibiting wrongful birth actions, it will have to give weight to the fact
that these states have established that life, no matter how "defective,"
125. Id. at 688.
126. See Id.
127. See Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983) (en banc).
128. Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528, 535 (N.C. 1985).
129. Id.
130. Bader v. Johnson, 732 N.E.2d 1212 (Ind. 2000).
131. Taylor, 600 N.W.2d at 687 (citing Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474
(1977)).
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cannot be an injury, and that preventing these lives from coming into
being is simple eugenics.
B. The Effects on the Medical Community
There are divergent views on how wrongful birth actions affect the
medical community. States that allow wrongful birth actions, either as
such or as medical malpractice claims, note that health care providers
ought to be held accountable when they fail to inform patients of a
possible birth defect that should have been detected. In Indiana, for
example, the court stated that prohibiting wrongful birth actions would
"immunize those in the medical field from liability for their performance
in one particular area of medical practice." ' Those subscribing to this
theory feel that there is no reason why a doctor who negligently treats a
patient in any other situation would be held accountable, but not when
the doctor misinforms parents about the risks of bearing a child born with
deficiencies. In Washington, the court held that there is a duty for
physicians to disclose to potential parents that their child will be born with
defects. 33 The court believed that imposing this duty would "promote
societal interest in genetic counseling and prenatal testing, deter medical
malpractice, and at least partially redress a clear and undeniable
wrong."' 34 States such as Washington believe that wrongful birth actions
promote full disclosure by physicians, that negligence by a physician
ought to be punished, and that punitive damages should be allowed to the
parents as redress.
Not all states believe that the medical community needs to be so strictly
monitored, however. Addressing the concern, the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania interpreted the Pennsylvania statute barring wrongful birth
actions as reflecting a "refusal to dictate to the medical profession how to
practice in the field of obstetrics."'35 The Pennsylvania legislature was
132. Bader v. Johnson, 732 N.E.2d 1212, 1219 (Ind. 2000) (quoting Garrison v.
Foy, 486 N.E.2d 5, 8 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).
133. See Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc. 656 P.2d 483, 491 (Wash. 1983)
(noting specifically that the duty does not obligate a physician to perform an
abortion if the doctor refuses to do so on moral or religious grounds).
134. Id. (citing Rogers, Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth: Medical
Malpractice in Genetic Counseling and Prenatal Testing, 33 S.C. L. REV. 713, 757
(1982)).
135. Dansby v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 623 A.2d 816, 820 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1994).
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also concerned with rising medical malpractice insurance rates that would
no doubt be increased if physicians were subject to a cause of action that
would "produce verdicts based on sheer speculations."'36  States that
prohibit wrongful birth actions justifiably fear that allowing such claims
will foster lawsuits against the doctor when a child is not born as
expected.' Doctor James Delahunty, the founder of the Association of
Pro-Life Obstetricians and Gynecologists, summarized this fear by
warning that "[i]f genetic tests give them the wrong results they blame the
doctor."'38
Allowing wrongful birth actions will place physicians in the precarious
position of having to determine what information needs to be given to the
parents so that they can make an informed decision about whether or not
to bring the fetus to term. In an effort to avoid litigation, doctors in these
jurisdictions will undoubtedly perform more tests than are medically
necessary, 9 thus creating the likelihood of a substantial rise in prenatal
care costs. Physicians in this position may face increased pressure to
recommend abortions in cases where it is uncertain whether or not a fetus
may be born with a birth defect. Increased prenatal testing will inevitably
lead to increased detection of possible birth defects, and physicians may
find it necessary to take the "safe" route of recommending abortion in
order to avoid a wrongful birth action. This will undoubtedly increase the
number of eugenic abortions, and raise additional issues regarding
conflicts between the patient's right to information and the moral and
religious convictions of the doctor.
Thus, the repercussions on the medical field in states that allow
wrongful birth actions could be significant. It is likely that would-be
136. Id.
137. See e.g., Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528, 535 (N.C. 1985); Atlanta
Obstetrics and Gynecology Group v. Abelson, 398 S.E.2d 557 (Ga. 1990).
138. Liz Townsend, "Wrongful-Birth" Lawsuits Abolished in Georgia and
Michigan, NAT'L RIGHT TO LIFE NEWS (Washington, D.C.) Aug. 10, 1999, at 13.
139. Note, Wrongful Birth Actions: The Case Against Legislative Curtailment,
100 HARV. L. REV. 2017, 2032 (1987) (citing Appellants' Brief at 33, Hickman v.
Group Health Plan, Inc., 396 N.W. 2d 10 (Minn. 1986) (No. 85-2013)). Opponents
of wrongful birth actions believe that allowing such actions will result in the
practice of so-called "defensive medicine." "Wrongful birth actions will force
physicians anxious to avoid malpractice liability 'to offer to each obstetrical
patient virtually every known test or procedure that might provide information
concerning the fetus' characteristics or qualities, regardless of whether the test or
procedure is medically necessary for either the fetus or mother."'
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physicians would avoid the fields of obstetrics and gynecology because of
the rise in medical malpractice premiums and the moral dilemmas that
will be associated with informing a parent of likely birth defects.
C. The Effects on the Child
Another public policy concern is the effect that a wrongful birth action
will have on the child. In Flowers v. District of Columbia,40 the court held
that it would be harmful to a child to learn that his parents, had they
141known of the defect prior to birth, would have chosen to abort him.
Although Flowers was a wrongful conception case, the court stated its
belief that "the damage to the child will be significant; that being an
unwanted or 'emotional bastard,' who will someday learn that its parents
did not want it, and, in fact, went to court to force someone else to pay forS•142
its raising," will be harmful. The court understood that to be successful
in a wrongful birth action, the parents would have to prove that their child
was unwanted and of no benefit to them. Detractors of this argument
may believe that, as one author notes, "by the time the child is old enough
to understand the nature of his parent's lawsuit against the physician he
should have enough independent evidence to evaluate the nature of his
parents' feelings towards him.' 43 However, courts and lawmakers need
to be concerned that even though a child will have independent evidence
of his or her parent's love, there will always be contradictory evidence
(and a court transcript) to prove that the child's parents convinced a jury
that the child was unwanted and would have been aborted if the
opportunity had presented itself.
D. The Effects on Others with Disabilities
In deciding whether to proscribe wrongful birth actions, the U.S.
Supreme Court would have to consider that allowing parents to recover
based on the "fact" that their handicapped child was an "injury" sends a
message to those with disabilities that their lives are less worthy. The
Pennsylvania Court in Dansby held that proscribing wrongful birth
140. 478 A.2d 1073 (D.C. 1987).
141. See id.
142. Id. at 1077 n.5 (citations omitted).
143. R. Keith Johnson, Note, Medical Malpractice and 'Wrongful Birth': A
Critical Analysis of Wilson v. Kuenzi 57 UMKC L. REV. 337, 347 (1989) (citations
omitted).
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actions "reflect[ed] the state's view that a handicapped child should not be
deemed better off dead and of less value than a 'normal' child.' 44 When a
state allows wrongful birth actions, even when bending traditional tort
principles to do so, it sends a pernicious message to its citizens with
disabilities; that the state places a higher value on its "normal" citizens.
The debate surrounding wrongful birth actions is an emotional one,
touching on such issues as abortion, sanctity of life, and ethics and
standards for physicians. However, it is the author's belief that the public
policy issues behind the prohibition of wrongful birth actions are the
issues that will ultimately determine how the Supreme Court, if called
upon, will decide whether or not states can prohibit wrongful birth
actions.
CONCLUSION
With the advent and emergence of new medical technology comes the
ability to determine with some certainty whether or not a child will be
born with defects. These medical advances, coupled with the Supreme
Court's decision to allow abortions, give couples the ability to terminate a
pregnancy when they believe it is in their best interest, or in what they
perceive to be the best interest of the fetus. Problems arise, however,
when the right to choose whether or not to abort is hindered by
negligence on behalf of the parents' health care provider. When
physicians fall below their standard of care and fail to inform parents of
their child's probable defects, they deprive the parents of the right to
abort that child. Whether this breach of duty is actionable, however, is
dependent on the state in which one brings the action.
There has been no consistent pattern among the state courts and
legislatures whether this negligence is actionable, and whether parents are
entitled to recover damages. Tort principles that provide the rationale in
states that permit wrongful birth actions are often compromised to allow
recovery for the parents. States that proscribe wrongful birth actions are
steadfast in their belief that all of the elements necessary for a tort are not
met in wrongful birth actions because of the difficulty in calculating
causation and damages. The inability to apply tort principles in wrongful
birth situations is based on the legislatures' and the courts' overriding
public policy concerns regarding eugenic abortions, the effects on the
medical community, and the refusal by the state to recognize that those
144. Dansby v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 623 A.2d 816, 820 (Pa. 1994).
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born with handicaps are less desirable than those born without. Should
the constitutionality of wrongful birth actions be challenged in the U.S.
Supreme Court, it is likely that public policy issues will determine whether
the court recognizes such a tort.
